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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Mitchell Dinnerstein, a former employee of Rowan College at Burlington County 
College (the “College”), appeals from the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment to the College.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background 
of this case, we discuss that background only briefly.  Dinnerstein was hired by the 
College in July 2007 as a maintenance mechanic-electrician.  In December 2013, 
Dinnerstein filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey, alleging that the College subjected to him to unlawful discrimination, a hostile 
work environment, and retaliation based on his religion – Judaism – in violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  Specifically, 
Dinnerstein claims that he was “slandered, devalued, [and] harassed” by the College, and 
when he reported acts of anti-Semitism to his supervisor, he was subjected to 
unwarranted discipline and eventually terminated.    
 Following a protracted discovery period, the College filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  Dinnerstein initially filed an “objection” to the College’s motion with a 
request for additional discovery, followed by a request for an extension of time to 
respond to the motion.  Shortly thereafter, the College filed a motion for sanctions and to 
deny Dinnerstein’s additional discovery demands and request additional time to respond 
to the summary judgment motion.  By order entered on November 21, 2017, the District 
Court granted the College’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Dinnerstein 
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had failed to establish prima facie claims of religious discrimination, hostile work 
environment, or retaliation, and that the College’s nondiscriminatory reason for firing 
Dinnerstein – several violations of the College’s Civility Policy – was not pretext for 
discrimination.  The District Court further denied Dinnerstein’s request for additional 
discovery and time as “unsupported” and “unwarranted,” and also denied the College’s 
request for sanctions.  Dinnerstein appeals.  
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment.  See 
McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
We agree with the District Court that Dinnerstein has failed to establish prima 
facie claims of religious discrimination, hostile work environment based on religious 
harassment, and retaliation.1  Because Dinnerstein has not introduced direct evidence of 
                                              
1 In his appellate brief, Dinnerstein claims that the District Court improperly granted 
summary judgment before he had time to complete discovery.  A court may defer ruling 
on a summary judgment motion if the “nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, 
for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(d).  The rule also “requires that a party indicate to the district court its need for 
discovery, what material facts it hopes to uncover and why it has not previously 
discovered the information.”  Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1393–94 (3d Cir. 1989). 
Dinnerstein did not clearly address Rule 56(d)’s requirements, either in the District Court 
or on appeal.  See Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 139–40 (3d Cir. 1988); see 
also Hamilton v. Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons, L.L.P., 687 F.3d 1045, 
1050 (8th Cir. 2012).  Because Dinnerstein has failed to demonstrate how any additional 
discovery will allow him to defeat the College’s well-supported motion for summary 
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discrimination, we analyze his claims under the burden-shifting framework set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).  Under the disparate 
treatment theory of religious discrimination, “the prima facie case and evidentiary 
burdens of an employee alleging religious discrimination mirror those of an employee 
alleging race or sex discrimination.”  Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 
F.3d 265, 281 (3d Cir. 2001).  Under this framework, a plaintiff seeking to establish a 
prima facie case discrimination must show that “(1) [he] is a member of a protected class; 
(2) [he] was qualified for the position [he] sought to attain or retain; (3) [he] suffered an 
adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that could 
give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”  Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 
214 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 Here, with regard to the fourth factor,2 the District Court properly determined that 
Dinnerstein’s generalized, subjective beliefs that Jewish members of the College’s 
administration are “going to discriminate against . . .  anyone who is not their friend,” and 
“they’re not going to listen to you and do what you say if you’re Jewish,” are insufficient 
to maintain an unlawful discrimination claim.  See Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 
1058 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]f the subjective beliefs of plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases could, by themselves, create genuine issues of material fact, then 
                                              
judgment, the District Court did not grant summary judgment prematurely or otherwise 
abuse its discretion in managing discovery. 




virtually all defense motions for summary judgment in such cases would be doomed.”) 
(citation omitted).  Moreover, Dinnerstein testified at his deposition to only two 
comments made by employees or administrators at the College referring to his Jewish 
faith.  First, he claimed that a coworker in the boiler room commented about him that 
“the Jew doesn’t know anything.”  Second, he testified that “[t]he entire maintenance 
shop” said that he was hired only because he is Jewish.  These “stray remarks,” which 
were not made by or to any of the College’s decisionmakers, are insufficient to show 
discrimination related to Dinnerstein’s termination.  See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & 
Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 Dinnerstein’s hostile work environment claim based on religious harassment fails 
for the same reasons.  See Abramson, 260 F.3d at 277.  Nor has Dinnerstein shown that 
his termination was motivated by the College’s intent to retaliate against him for 
reporting acts of anti-Semitism.  Dinnerstein’s deposition testimony that he “thinks” he 
told the College administrators when he was given his final warning that he was 
discriminated against because of his Jewish faith does not establish a causal connection 
between that activity and his termination.  See Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 
181, 196 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 Even if Dinnerstein could satisfy his prima facie burden with regard to any of his 
allegations, nothing in the record suggests that the College’s proffered explanation for 
terminating Dinnerstein – that he violated the College’s Civility Policy on several 
occasions – was pretext.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994).  The 
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undisputed record shows that the College addressed violations of the Civility Policy with 
Dinnerstein on several occasions in 2008 and issued him a final warning after he yelled 
profanities at a coworker in August 2011.  Dinnerstein admitted in his deposition that 
when he was terminated on December 1, 2011, for yelling profanities at his supervisors, 
he knew that he had been issued prior warnings, understood what the warnings meant, but 
had nevertheless used profane language with his supervisors in violation of the Civility 
Policy.3  Because Dinnerstein has failed to provide evidence from which a factfinder 
could reasonably infer that the College’s proffered reason for terminating him is pretext 
for discrimination, the District Court properly granted summary judgment to the College 
as to Dinnerstein’s claims.4 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  In light of 
our disposition, we deny Dinnerstein’s motion to expedite the appeal as moot; his motion 
to file an overlength brief is granted.  We note that the Clerk previously granted the 
                                              
3 When asked whether he called his supervisor “the F word” or used other profanities, 
Dinnerstein replied “Yeah, it’s in there,” referring to a hearing transcript.  He further 
admitted in his deposition to calling someone a “pantywaist faggot.”   
 
4 Dinnerstein also argues in his appellate brief that he was suspended for refusing to put 
his electrical license in jeopardy by allowing unqualified co-workers to perform electrical 
work improperly under his supervision.  However, he has failed to demonstrate either in 
the District Court or here how this discipline is in any way related to his religion and his 
underlying discrimination claims.  Moreover, this allegation, even if true, does not permit 
a finding that the College’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing Dinnerstein 




College’s motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix.  To the extent that the 
College’s motion requests further relief, it is denied.    
 
